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Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) confers original jurisdiction over this appeal, which is 
an appeal from an order entered in a domestic relations case. 
ISSUES P R E S E N T E D A N D STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding alimony to Petitioner 
where the Trial Court, in determining Petitioner's need for alimony, included child-related 
expenses as part of Petitioner's monthly expenses, yet failed to adequately consider the 
monthly Child Support payments receive from Respondent as part of Petitioner's ability to 
meet her monthly expenses? 
Standards of Review: Alimony determinations are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 260 (Utah 1999); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 179 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and 
property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Homllv. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). In exercising its discretion, however, the trial court must make explicit 




PRESERVATION OF T H E ISSUES 
The issue, regarding the Trial Court's calculation of Petitioner's need for alimony, 
was preserved during the trial ruling (see R. at 498; Ruling transcript at 12, 13-25), in a timely 
post-trial Rule 52(b) Motion for Clarification of Findings of Fact (see R. at 315), and in a timely 
post-trial Notice of Appeal (see R. at 454). 
R E L E V A N T STATUTORY A N D CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U T A H C O D E A N N . § 30-3-5(8)(a): 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony; 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by 
the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or 
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASE 
Nature of the Case: This appeal resulted from a domestic relations case heard in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. The issue on appeal arises out of the 
determination of alimony support made by the Trial Court. Respondent argues that the Trial 
Court erred in its determination of alimony and that said error amounts to an addressable 
abuse of discretion. 
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Course of Proceedings: On or about September 23, 2005, SHERRIE C ELOFF 
(Petitioner / Appellee) petitioned for a divorce from her husband, BRUCE C ELOFF 
(Respondent /Appellant). See R. at 1. As part of said Petition, Petitioner requested alimony 
See R. at 5. The issue of alimony came before the Trial Court by way of a Bench Trial on June 
12, 2007. See R. at 262. The Trial Court, after hearing arguments, entered its Ruling and 
resulting determination of alimony on June 13, 2007 See R. at 264. 
Disposition in the Court Below On July 19, 2007, the Trial Court entered a Decree of 
Divorce {see R. at 288) and Findings of Fact and Conclusions oflMw (see R. at 269) On July 26, 
2007, Respondent filed a timely Motion for Clarification of Findings of Fact pursuant to Rule 52(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure See R. at 315. On September 19, 2007, m a Minute 
Entry entitle Minute Entry and Order Denying Respondent's Objection to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Decree, and Motion for Clarification, the Trial Court denied Respondent's Motion for 
Clarification of Findings of Fact {see R. at 404) and declared, "This signed Minute Entry shall 
constitute the Order of the Court resolving the matters referenced herein, no further Order is 
required" (see R. at 405) Respondent then filed a timely Notice of Appeal on October 19, 2007 
SeeR at 454. 
Statement of Facts: At trial the Parties agreed that, for child support purposes, 
Petitioner would be deemed to have income of $3,137 per month. See R. at 498 (Trial 
transcript at 5, 20-24). The Parties also agreed that, for child support purposes, Respondent 
would be deemed to have income of $6,760 per month See R. at 498 (Trial transcript at 6, 2-
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
3 
3). Additionally, the Parties agreed that Child Support would be paid by Respondent to 
Petitioner (see R. at 498 (Trial transcript at 6; 21-23)) and that the agreed upon income 
amounts would be used to calculate the base child support amount. See R. at 498 (Trial 
transcript at 23; 13-23). The resulting Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered on July 19, 
2007, indicate that Petitioner would receive from Respondent an adjusted child support 
amount of $818.26 per month (adjusted from a base child support amount of $941.12). See R. 
at 274. 
At trial, the Trial Court heard arguments regarding Petitioner's gross income and 
Petitioner's reasonable and necessary expenses. See R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15). 
Petitioner claimed total monthly expenses of $4,198.99. See R. at 251. This expense amount 
included expenses for the Children as well as for the Petitioner. Id. Based on the evidence 
presented and after having made adjustments, the Trial Court found, for alimony purposes, 
Petitioner's gross income to be $3,137 and Petitioner's reasonable and necessary monthly 
expenses to be $3,461. See R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15). The Trial Court concluded 
that Petitioner suffered a shortfall in the amount of $324. Id. 
Also at trial, the Trial Court heard arguments regarding Respondent's gross income 
and Respondent's reasonable and necessary expenses. See R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 5; 16-
25). Based on the evidence presented, the Trial Court found, for alimony purposes, 
Respondent's gross income to be $6,760 and Respondent's reasonable and necessary monthly 
expenses to be $4,372. Id. The Trial Court then concluded that Respondent had the ability to 
pay alimony, and consequently, the Trial Court ordered that Respondent pay Petitioner 
alimony support in the amount of $324 per month. Id. 
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In making the alimony determination ruling, the Trial Court held the following 
conversation (see R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 12, 13-25)* 
Mr. Reading: Yeah. Okay. And your Honor, at this point, a clarification Back 
to the alimony issue, you mentioned that the Petitioner had $3,137, that 
included, I guess, the child support? 
Mr. McPhie: No. 
The Court. No. I did not include that child support in the calculation and I 
cited it as a gross amount of her income. 
Mr. Reading: And - and so that was not taken into account to help pay those 
expenses? 
The Court It was taken into account, but it was not included by me as income 
for alimony purposes. 
On July 7, 2007, Respondent filed a Motion for Clarification of Finding of Fact pursuant to 
Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure wherein Respondent requested that the Trial 
Court articulate its basis in fact and law as to not including the child support award of $818 26 
per month when determining Petitioner's ability to meet her monthly needs for the purposes 
of alimony. See R. at 315 Respondent's request was denied on September 19, 2007, m a 
Minute Entry from the Trial Court 
SUMMARY O F T H E A R G U M E N T S 
In determining alimony, courts are required to consider the financial condition and 
needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient spouse or ability of 
recipient spouse to produce income, and the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) It is an abuse of discretion to fail to adequately consider the 
aforementioned factors in determining alimony. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1987) Trial courts are required to make findings on each of these factors and said findings 
must follow logically from, and be supported by, the evidence Andrus v Andm\, 169 P 3d 
754, 759 (Utah Ct App 2007) Failure to do so is reversible error Id 
In the case at hand, in determining alimony, the Trial Court erred in its analysis of the 
Petitioner's financial condition and thereby overstated the financial needs of the Petitioner 
In determimng Petitioner's financial condition and ability to produce income, the Trial Court 
did not include the $818 26 monthly child support payments Petitioner receives from 
Respondent At the same time, m determining Petitioner's needs for alimony support, the 
Trial Court did include the monthly child-related expenses This calculation method had the 
effect of increasing Petitioner's monthly expenses (by including the Children's monthly 
expenses), while simultaneously decreasing Petitioner's monthly income (by not including the 
child support payments) As a result, the Trial Court mis-characterized Petitioner's financial 
condition and artificially inflated Petitioner's financial needs 
Therefore, the Trial Court's failure to adequately consider the financial conditions and 
need of Petitioner was an addressable abuse of discretion, and the Trial Court's failuie to 
adequately consider the ability of Petitioner to produce sufficient income for herself was an 
addressable abuse of discretion The resulting alimony determination was in error because it 
failed to meet the requirements under Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5(8)(a) and was not was not 
supported by the findings Moreover, the alimony determination did not follow logically 
from, nor was it supported by, the evidence. Thus, Trial Court abused its discretion in 




I. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Determining Alimony Because 
the Trial Court Failed to Adequately Evaluate the Needs and Financial 
Condition of the Petitioner 
The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife Medley v. Medley, 93 P 3d 
847, 849 (Utah Ct. App 2004) (relying on Georgedes v Georgedes, 627 P 2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981) 
An alimony award should enable the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage Munns v. Munns, 790 P 2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct 
App 1990) While the awarding of alimony and the fixing of the amount thereof are within 
the sound discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not arbitrary, and the award or 
refusal to award is subject to correction on appeal if it is erroneous on its face or unjust to 
either party Vnedh v. Fnedh, 238 P 647, 648 (Utah 1925) 
In determining alimony, a trial court must consider three factors (1) the financial 
condition and need of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce 
sufficient income for himself or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide support Munns v. Munns, 790 P 2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct App.1990) (Also see Noble v 
Noble, 761 P 2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988), Jones v. Jones, 700 P 2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), and 
Haumont v Haumont, 793 P 2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct App 1990)) These factors are commonly 
referred to as the "Jones Factors." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App 
2003). Failure to adequately consider the three factors is an abuse of discretion Id. 
In Bingham, the court reversed and remanded the judgement of the trial court because 
the trial court failed to adequately consider the financial needs and condition of Ms. Bingham 
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(Wife). Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). There, Mr. Bingham 
(Husband) argued that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Wife more alimony 
than her expenses necessitated. The trial court awarded Wife $1,431.76 in child support and 
$1,750.00 in alimony for a total monthly support payment of $3,181.76. At trial, Wife 
estimated her overall monthly expenses at $3,080. After further evaluation, the trial court 
reduced Wife's overall monthly expenses by $600 and thereby assessed Wife's overall monthly 
expenses at $2,480. Therefore, as the reviewing court noted, the trial court awarded Wife an 
excess of $701.76 per month over Wife's established financial need requirement. In holding 
that the trial court abused its discretion, the reviewing court stated; "Where the trial court has 
offered no explanation for such a discrepancy, we agree with [Husband] that the court should 
not have awarded [Wife] more than her established need required, regardless of [Husband's] 
ability to pay this excess amount. Accordingly, we remand the case for a reassessment of the 
alimony award in accordance with the precept that the spouse's demonstrated need must, 
under Jones, constitute the maximum permissible alimony award." Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 
1065, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The facts in case at hand are similar to those in Bingham. By not including child support 
payments as part of Petitioner's financial condition and needs, the Trial Court also abused its 
discretion in awarding Plaintiff more alimony than her expenses necessitated. The Trial 
Court, in the case at hand, awarded Petitioner $818.26 in child support {see R. at 274) and 
$324 in alimony {see R. at 498(Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15)) for a total monthly support 
payment of $1,142.26. At trial, Petitioner estimated her overall monthly expenses, including 
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child-related expenses, at $4,198.99. See R. at 251. Just as in Bingham, the Trial Court, upon 
further evaluation, reduced Petitioner's overall monthly expenses by the amount of $737.99 
and thereby assessed Petitioner's overall monthly expenses at $3,461. See R. at 498 (Ruling 
transcript at 5; 7-15). The Trial Court held that Petitioner's gross income is $3,137 and 
therefore, Petitioner's resulting need for alimony was $324. Id. In giving its Ruling, the Trial 
Court stated that it did not include child support in the calculation. Id. This is in error and the 
Trial Court did not adequately evaluate Petitioner's financial condition and needs. Further, 
the Court gave no explanation as to its reasoning for excluding the child support payments 
from its financial condition and needs analysis. Id. 
Here, Petitioner receives $818.26 in monthly child support payments. See R. at 498 
(Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15). If this is added to the $3,137 monthly income of Petitioner, as 
is required in an adequate evaluation of Petitioner's financial condition and needs, it can be 
seen that Petitioner has $3,955.26 per month to address her $3,461 overall monthly expenses; 
or a $494.26 monthly surplus. Therefore, the Trial Court awarded Petitioner an excess over 
her established financial need requirement. Thus, the $324 alimony award is not necessary and 
said award does not reflect Petitioner's true financial condition or needs as the courts require. 
As in Bingham, Petitioner was awarded an excess over her established financial need 
requirement; therefore, just as in Bingham, this Court of Review should hold that the Trial 
Court should not have awarded Petitioner alimony in excess of her established need, 
regardless of Respondent's ability to pay this excess amount. This Court should hold that the 
Trial Court abused its discretion in its alimony determination by not establishing Petitioner's 
true financial condition or needs as required by the Jones Factors. 
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II. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Determining Alimony Because 
the Trial Court Failed to Enter Specific Findings on the N e e d s and 
Financial Condition of the Petitioner 
In considering the Jones Factors, the trial court is required to make adequate factual 
findings on all material issues unless the facts in the record are clear, un-controverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 
546 (Utah C t App. 1993). If the trial court considers these factors in setting an award of 
alimony, the reviewing court will not disturb its award absent a showing that such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. However, where a trial court 
fails to enter specific findings on the needs and condition of the recipient spouse, making 
effective review of the alimony award impossible, that omission is an abuse of discretion. 
Bakanowski v. Bakanoivski, 80 P.3d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). Detailed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are necessary for the reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's 
discretionary determination of the alimony award was rationally based. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In Bakanowski, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to enter specific findings on Ms. Bakanowski's (Wife) needs and financial condition. 
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). In so doing, the Court of 
Appeals noted that the pertinent facts in the record were not clear, un-controverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. Id. At trail, the court found 
Wife's monthly living expenses of $5,259 to be inflated. Rather than evaluating Wife's 
monthly budget, the trial court ruled that Wife could not enjoy a similar standard of living as 
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Husband without a $1,000 monthly award. The trial court then concluded that Wife 
demonstrated a need for alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month and ordered Mr. 
Bakanowski (Husband) to pay said alimony. 
In holding that the trial court abused its discretion in determining alimony, the 
reviewing court paid particular attention to the trial court's failure to adequately determine 
Wife's financial condition and needs. The court of appeals noted that the trial court, upon 
finding that Wife's monthly living expenses to be inflated, explicitly avoided evaluating her 
monthly needs and her ability to meet those needs. The court of review also noted that in 
attempting to equalize the parties income, the trial court, neglected to employ the traditional 
needs analysis and as such the trial court abused its discretion. In finding an abuse of 
discretion, the court of review stated; "The absence of findings of fact is a fundamental defect 
that makes it impossible to review the issues that were briefed without invading the trial 
court's fact-finding domain. The findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or 
decree follows logically from, and is supported by the evidence." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 
P.3d 153, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Here, we suffer from the same abuse of discretion as the reviewing court found in 
Bakanowski. In the case at hand, we cannot say that the Trial Court's decree follows logically 
from, and is supported by the evidence as is required under Bakanowski. This is because, here, 
the Trial Court also avoided evaluating Petitioner's monthly need and her ability to meet those 
needs. In its findings, the Trial Court simply stated the Parties gross income in the amounts 
the Parties agreed upon for the purposes of a child support determination. See R. at 498 
(Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15). In this regard, the Court failed to enter specific findings on the 
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financial needs and condition of Petitioner. This is in error and said omission not only 
amounts to an abuse of discretion, but the omission makes effective review of the alimony 
award impossible. The Trial Court refused to include the child support Petitioner receives 
from Respondent. See R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 13; 12-25). Like in Bakanomki, this falls 
short of an adequate evaluation of Petitioner's monthly needs and her ability to meet those 
needs. Additionally, the Trial Court in the case at hand "made some adjustments" to 
Petitioner's claimed expenses by reducing Petitioner's monthly expenses to $3,461. See R. at 
498 (Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15). There are no findings as to which expenses were adjusted 
or how the court arrived at the reduced monthly expense amount. Id. Again, in this regard, 
the Court failed to enter specific findings on the financial needs and condition of Petitioner. 
This is in error and said omission not only amounts to an abuse of discretion, but the 
omission makes effective review of the alimony award impossible. 
Therefore in the case at hand, like in Bakanomki, the Trial Court did not make 
sufficient findings concerning Petitioner's true financial condition and needs. The Trial Court 
neglected to employ the traditional needs analysis and as such the trial court abused its 
discretion. Thus, the absence of findings of fact is a fundamental defect that makes it 
impossible to review the issues without invading the trial court's fact-finding domain, and the 
findings of fact in the instant case do not show that the court's judgment or decree follows 




Trial Court abused its discretion in determining alimony because the Trial Court failed 
to adequately consider the financial condition and needs of the Petitioner. The Petitioner was 
awarded an excess over her established financial need requirement; therefore, this Court of 
Review should hold that the Trial Court should not have awarded Petitioner alimony, 
regardless of Respondent's ability to pay this excess amount. This Court should hold that the 
Trial Court abused its discretion in its alimony determination by not establishing Petitioner's 
true financial condition or needs as required by the Jones Factors. 
Additionally, the Trial Court neglected to enter specific finding on the needs and 
financial condition of the Petitioner. The Trial Court neglected to adequately employ the 
traditional needs analysis and as such the Trial Court abused its discretion. The absence of 
findings of fact is a fundamental defect that makes it impossible to review the issues without 
invading the Trial Court's fact-finding domain, and the findings of fact in the instant case do 
not show that the Court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by the 
evidence as required. For the forgoing reasons, the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
determining alimony award and said alimony award should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<£ day of May, 2008. 
SCALLEY READING BATES 
HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C. 
J. Bruce Reading 
Mitchell T. Brooks 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
SHERRIE C. ELOFF, 
Petitioner, 
vs 
Case No. 054905322 DA 
RULING 
BRUCE C. ELOFF, 
Respondent. 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of June, 2 0 07, 
commencing at the hour of 4:04 p.m., the above-entitled matterj 
came on for hearing before the HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY, 
sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of 
this cause, and that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
DEPOMAXMERIT 
: LITIGATION SERVICES 
333 S O U T H RIO GRANDE 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
w w w DEPOMAXMERIT COM 
T O L L FREE 800 337 6629 ]J 
PHONE 801 328 1188 
FAX 801 328 1189 
• A TRADITION OF QUALITY • 
For the Petitioner: 
For the Respondent: 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
DAVID A. McPHIE 
Attorney at Law 
2105 East Murray-Hollady Road 
Holladay, Utah 84117 
J. BRUCE READING 
Attorney at Law 
Scalley, Reading, Bates, 
Hansen & Rasmussen 
15 West South Temple, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
2 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
THE COURT: Yes. And--and by the way, I have--I'm 
going to do something just slightly different on that T.R.O., 
not--not very different, but just slightly different. 
Exactly. 
And I'll explain that to you--
I won't need you to do that, but I'll explain that 
after we get through this matter. So, can I hang up now? Are 
you going to send them in? Okay. Yeah, I'm sure--
I'm--yes. All right. 
Are both of you there? Okay. I need to put you on 
hold so that I can get you on my speaker phone, okay? So, 
hold on. 
Okay. Are both of you still there? 
MR. READING: We are. 
MR. McPHIE: I am. 
THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. McPhie, your voice 
sounded just slightly distant. Can you speak--
MR. McPHIE: Okay. Is this better now? 
THE COURT: Yes. Yes. That is better. 
3 
MR. McPHIE: Okay. 
THE COURT: And by the way, this is case numbered 
054905322 and we are on the record at this time and since vve 
are on the record, let's start with counsel for the petitioner 
and just for the record purposes, identify yourself, please. 
MR. McPHIE: Yes. David McPhie for the petitioner, 
S h e m e Eloff . 
MR. READING: Bruce Reading on behalf of Bruce 
Eloff. 
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, as you are aware, this 
is the time I set for ruling on the issues that were submitted 
to me for resolution. Yesterday we had a trial m this 
particular divorce case. The majority of the issues were 
resolved by way of stipulation and only a few issues remain. 
Initially, because I don't think I made this 
pronouncement yesterday, I should state that based upon the 
testimony presented, the Court is satisfied that jurisdiction 
is m fact proper in this case and that grounds of 
irreconcilable differences have been established, warranting 
a--a--the granting of a divorce between these parties. I 
don't think I made that pronouncement yesterdaiy. So, I do so 
now. 
I'm going to go immediately to the issue of alimony 
and this is how I have resolved that particular issue. First 
of all, I'd like to state for the record that I have 
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1 considered all of the required Jones factors. I've obviously 
2 also taken into consideration how these parties are 
3 respectively employed. Additionally, I've taken into 
4 consideration the age of these parties and I--I've also taken 
5 into consideration and this Court has in fact found that this 
6 is in fact, a long term marriage. 
7 Based upon the evidence presented, Counsel, I have 
8 found, for alimony purposes, the petitioner's gross income to 
9 be in the approximate amount of $3,137. Additionally, based 
10 upon the evidence presented, I have also found, and obviously, 
11 I have made some adjustments, but I have found that the 
12 petitioner's reasonable and necessary expenses are in the 
13 approximate total amount of $3,461; consequently, I am finding 
14 that petitioner does have a shortfall in the amount of $324. 
15 So, she does have that amount of unmet need. 
16 Additionally, for alimony purposes, I am finding 
17 that the respondent has gross income in the approximate amount 
18 of $6,760 and that he has reasonable monthly expenses in the 
19 approximate amount of $4,372. So, I am finding that the 
20 respondent has the ability to pay alimony; consequently, I'm 
21 awarding the petitioner alimony in this case in the amount of 
22 $324, consistent with the standard limitations and 
23 restrictions and by that, I simply mean subject to remarriage, 
24 cohabitation, for the duration of the term of the parties' 
25 marriage. 
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I'm going to go next to the issue of personal 
property. 
Excuse me. I needed to take a sip of water. 
Regarding the issue of personaL property, I have 
resolved that issue as follows: 
Can both of you still hear me? 
MR. McPHIE: I can. 
MR. READING: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Good. 
I'm resolving this issue as follows: I am going to 
find that it is equitable to affirm the division of the 
personal property as the parties--as exists between the 
parties as of the date of trial, as the parties have divided 
that personal property. So, I am affirming that distribution 
and division as equitable, with the following exceptions, and 
those exceptions are these: 
The 1997 Blazer is kind of a little difficult for me 
to characterize and what I mean by that, it has some 
characteristics of being separate property, since I am finding 
that it came to the respondent by way of the death of his 
father. The vehicle has always been titled m his name, yet, 
at the same time, for a fairly lengthy period of time, it 
appears as if that--the petitioner had the substantial, full 
use of that vehicle. And I am finding, obviously, that 
marital assets were used for the maintenance a.nd upkeep on 
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1 that vehicle, even if it is a 1997 Chevy Blazer. 
2 But because of that mixed type of character, I am 
3 going to award the 1997 Blazer to the respondent, free and 
4 clear from any claim or interest m the vehicle by the 
5 petitioner, in part, because of its, what I'm describing to be 
6 it's, in part, it's non-marital asset character because of the 
7 manner m which this property was held by way of title and the 
8 manner m which it has come to the respondent. 
9 Additionally, I'm making this award of the Blazer to 
10 the respondent, m part, as an equitable set-off against the 
11 personal property distribution that the Court has affirmed 
12 here just a moment ago. 
13 The other exception regarding this personal property 
14 distribution will be as to the piano, which accordingly--
15 according to the evidence presented, has a value of 
16 approximately $7,000. And how I'm going to deal with that 
17 piece of property is as follows- Unless the parties agree 
18 otherwise m writing, the piano is awarded to both parties 
19 equally. The petitioner will have the right and opportunity 
20 to the possession and control of the piano. The parties will 
21 be required to share equally m any costs of repair or 
22 maintaining the piano. 
23 Additionally, the parties will share equally m any 
24 appreciation or increased value m the piano. And then I'm 
25 going to order that the piano be sold--ordered to be sold upon 
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1 the last minor child reaching the age of majority. 
2 Those are the only exceptions to the personal 
3 property distribution. 
4 The next issue I'm going to address deals with the 
5 issue of pick up and delivery of the children and I'm going to 
6 resolve this issue in this manner. I'm of the opinion that 
7 the most equitable thing for me to do is to resolve this issue 
8 by maintaining the status quo, which results in the respondent 
9 being responsible for pick up and delivery of the minor 
10 children when exercising his visitation. 
11 The reason why I'm persuaded that that is the--
12 maintaining the status quo is the most appropriate way to 
13 resolve this issue, because it's readily apparent from the 
14 evidence presented, that these minor children are engaged m 
15 various extracurricular activities and it is tne petitioner, 
16 for the most part, is responsible for the transportation for 
17 those extracurricular activities and in an attempt to resolve 
18 this issue equitably, I'm going to maintain the status quo 
19 I'm not sure this is--this still remains to be an 
20 issue for me to resolve. I--I think this next issue was 
21 resolved by way of stipulation and this deals with the issue 
22 of the petitioner's request to pick up the minor children from 
23 the respondent, to have them attend church and then return the 
24 children. 
2 5 MR McPHIE: We've agreed to that. 
1 THE COURT: Okay. I thought that that was resolved 
2 by way of stipulation, so that--it's not--
3 MR. READING: That is true, your Honor. The only 
4 caveat would be is if he--if he happened to have another 
5 activity planned for that day or was going to be out of town 
6 with the kids, I mean--
7 MR. McPHIE: That was also agreed. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. And since that--
9 MR. McPHIE: If he's going out of town, then she 
10 can't say, you can't take them 'cause it's Sunday, but if he's 
11 m town--
12 MR. READING: And not fishing--
13 MR. McPHIE: Yeah. 
14 MR. READING: --they--they need to go. 
15 THE COURT: Well, are you sure you--if you're sure 
16 you have a stipulation as to that issue, I won't say anymore. 
17 MR. READING: I think that's on the record that way. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Now, let me go next to the issue 
19 that deals with the respondent's request for the equal sharing 
20 of taxes incurred for the 2005-2006 tax year. I think this is 
21 based upon an increase m the Scott Trade accounts. It was 
22 alleged that that sum to be, I think in the approximate amount 
23 of two--total amount of $2,137. 
24 Listen, I'm going to require that the petitioner 
25 share equally one-half of that debt, but that needs to be 
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documented. 
MR. McPHlE: Not a problem, your Honor 
THE COURT: I'm also going to require the petitioner 
to share m one-half of the cell phone bill, the cell phone 
bill was $74.57, one-half of the medical expense bill, which 
is--was in the total of $31.94. I'm denying the respondent's 
request that the petitioner share m the--any expense for the 
air conditioning bill. 
Going next to what I think will be the last issue, 
is the respondent's request that he receive four percent 
interest on his equitable lien. I struggled with this request 
for some time, until I located some Utah case law that appears 
to clearly hold that awarding interest on an ecjuitable lien is 
not appropriate. 
And you should know that I am relying on two cases, 
the first case is a domestic relations case and I probably 
will mispronounce the name of the case, I think is Osguthorpe 
vs. Osguthorpe and the case is found at 804 P. 2d 530. It's a 
19 90 Utah Court of Appeals case. 
Also, that Osguthorpe case is upheld m a subsequent 
case of Lovato vs. Lovato, which is a 2002 Utah Court of 
Appeals case, the cite on that case is 2002 Utah Appeals 162. 
And the general holdings of those two opinions is as 
follows: That an equitable lien is unlike a judgment and only 
gives the lienholder a right to collect the debt out of the 
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1 charged property. In those cases, the court held that 
2 interest could not accrue until the equitable lien was reduced 
3 to judgment, after the happening of one of the contingencies 
4 that will result m reducing the equitable lien to a judgment. 
5 Until that occurs, interest on equitable lien is not 
6 appropriate and m the--m both cases that I cited to you, the 
7 trial court was reversed for awarding interest on an equitable 
8 lien. So, I'm going to follow that direction and deny the 
9 respondent's request. 
10 MR. McPHIE: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: I think that that resolves all the 
12 issues with the exception of maybe one and that would be the 
13 issue of attorney's fees. And do you wish me to resolve that 
14 now? 
15 MR. READING: If you're in a position that you can 
16 do that, sure. 
17 MR. McPHIE: If you're m a position to do it, sure. 
18 THE COURT: From my vantage point, based upon the 
19 evidence presented, although I recognize that there is a 
20 disparity m the incomes of--of these parties, I would 
21 conclude and find that it is most equitable for this Court to 
22 order that the parties be responsible for their own attorney's 
23 fees m this particular case. Consequently, I would not find 
24 any necessity to require either side to submit affidavits m 
2 5 support. 
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1 MR. McPHIE: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: I think that that's it. 
3 MR. McPHIE: I think that is. 
4 Do you want me to prepare this? This is David 
5 McPhie talking. Sorry. 
6 THE COURT: That's fine. But I would like to see 
7 the documents come to me--
8 MR. McPHIE: I'll submit them to opposing counsel --
9 THE COURT: Yeah. They need to be signed off at 
10 least as to form and definitely as to form and content as to 
11 the matters that were stipulated to. Do you see what I'm 
12 saying? 
13 MR. READING: Yeah. Okay. And your Honor, at this 
14 point, a clarification. Back to the alimony issue, you 
15 mentioned that the petitioner had $3,13 7, that included, I 
16 guess, the child support? 
17 MR. McPHIE: No. 
18 THE COURT: No. I did not include that child 
19 support m the calculation and I cited it as a gross amount of 
2 0 her income. 
21 MR. READING: And--and so that was not taken into 
22 account to help pay those expenses? 
23 THE COURT: It was taken into account, but it was 
24 not included by me as income for alimony purposes. 
2 5 MR. READING: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Any other points of clarification? 
MR. McPHIE: We'll submit this to you pre-approved. 
THE COURT: Mr. Reading? 
MR. READING: That--I think that was the only 
on I had, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Hey, listen, thank 
ry much. 
MR. READING: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Bye. 
MR. READING: Bye, now. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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